Deprivation to deliverance in Myanmar on Astini News

DEVELOPMENT

The opposition National League for Democracy's virtual sweep of 43 out of 44 MP seats in Myanmar's recent by-elections was a long time coming.

From more than two decades of deprivation and repression, Myanmar politics finally appears to have entered an era of democratic deliverance. It has done so in a breathtaking fashion, going from strength to strength and putting next-door Thailand's democratic credentials to shame. But it is far from being out of the woods of military authoritarianism. A full and direct reversal in Myanmar is now difficult to foresee but deviations and detours from the democratic road ahead cannot be ruled out.

Myanmar's spectacular results spell far-reaching implications for politics at home, the regional neighbourhood and the broader international community.

For all stakeholders, how this ethnically diverse country of 60 million at the intersection of China, India and Asean refers to itself and how it is referred to will hold symbolic and substantive significance at once.

Myanmar used to be called Burma. It is still called Burma by many as a show of defiance and disdain for the former military regime that ruled the country brutally for decades.

Under iconic and vindicated opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD's participation and triumph in the by-elections, while winning less than 7% of total MP seats, will put pressure on key stakeholders to unify under the name Myanmar to concede and recognise the legitimacy of recent reforms.

There will be holdouts but Myanmar's forward momentum rests on its official name, which also may provide greater accommodation to its vociferous ethnic composition.

The NLD's thumping victory is both portentous and ominous for the Union Solidarity and Development Party, the military's electoral vehicle. All things equal, the by-elections suggest the NLD is likely to win a massive landslide when general elections are held again in 2015. Even if the military retains an automatic, constitutionally mandated 25% of all seats, the USDP is unlikely to withstand the opposition's election onslaught. The NLD as the main opposition party is thus on course to gain control of the national assembly in three years.

It is crucial for the NLD to prioritise the broader reform process over the shorter-term electoral gains and temptations for retribution. Democratic transitions from military authoritarianism in other countries have typically taken many years, with ups and downs, and with different modalities of civil-military power-sharing during military withdrawals.

For Thailand it took five decades to progress from outright military dictatorship to democratic rule, and it has not yet consolidated.

A key period was the 1980s under a so-called semi-democracy, where the military retained some reins of government and civilians the rest. Myanmar's reformers from the military era require continued concessions to keep the train on its track. Going back to the barracks _ and being confined there _ will definitely take time.

Yet a full and direct reversal to another outright dictatorship is unlikely. The beginnings of Myanmar's reforms with a dubious pro-military constitution and a bogus election have somehow taken on a life of their own. The vested interests for the fruits of reform have become wider and more entrenched. For example, Myanmar will host the Southeast Asian Games next year and assume the Asean chairmanship in 2014. Misbehaving with more military repression will not only mean loss of face but also a potential loss of these prestigious hosting opportunities and acceptance in the wider world. The generals suffered wounded pride when they had to forego the Asean chairmanship in 2005 and are presumably not keen to face another regional humiliation. Suitors from abroad for business and commerce, for aid and development, provide additional incentives to maintain momentum.

The immediate implication for the Asean neighbourhood centres on democratisation. Asean is home to the most diverse regime types among regional organisations. If Myanmar can democratise, why can't others? The pressure to democratise will grow. At a minimum, Myanmar's progress will not be a boon to authoritarian regimes. There are myriad positive spillover effects for nearby regimes, not least Thailand's. The authoritarian road is a dead end even if democratisation can be necessarily messy and problematic.

Along the same lines, the major powers will have much to draw from in Myanmar's road ahead. The cost-benefit dynamics are clear. It is mainly Western countries, namely the United States and more or less the European Union members, which stand to benefit from reforms in terms of values and interests. The same goes for India, although it charts more of an independent course not glued to the West. By contrast, it is difficult to imagine Beijing as pleased and enthusiastic about Myanmar's by-election results. The superpower rivalry between the US and China in mainland Southeast Asia is thus affected by Myanmar's momentum.

Ultimately, Myanmar's fragile progress is for the Myanmar people. Its ceasefire agreements with ethnic minorities are still delicate and will need to be solidified. Its overweening suitors will now come from everywhere as if they are in a gold rush. The chief challenge for the country comes from history and time. It has to undergo economic development in warped time, an agrarian country having to grapple with the forces of globalisation not over several decades but in several years. Its best chance is to maintain a moving, adaptable and symbiotic power-sharing arrangement over the immediate horizon.

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The writer is Director of the Institute of Security and International Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University.